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OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal by Scot A. Reinert
(“Reinert”), a state prisoner serving a
sentence of life imprisonment for first
degree murder, from an order of the
District Court denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, presents two
congeries of issues, one dealing with
Miranda rights, and the other with
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Considering the Miranda issues first, we
must evaluate the admissibility of three
statements made by Reinert when he was
being transported to the hospital by
2emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”),
accompanied by police officers.  The
admissibility of the first two statements—
one to an EMT and the other to an officer,
both of which were given prior to the
a d m i n is t r at ion of  an y Miranda
warnings—turns on whether Reinert was
in custody at the time he made the
statements.  The admissibility of the third
statement, made to a police officer after a
Miranda warning had been given, depends
on Reinert’s competence at the time to
waive his Miranda rights.  Then we must
determine whether Reinert was competent
to waive his Miranda rights when he made
a statement to two detectives at the
hospital following surgery.  We do not, of
course, either write or decide on a blank
slate.  The record contains fact findings by
the state trial judge following a
suppression hearing, and our decision
making is constrained by the rigorous
standard of review under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), codified in relevant part at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255.
We are satisfied that, at the time of
Reinert’s first statement, made to an EMT
when he was being transported to the
hospital for treatment (at which time he
was not a crime suspect and indeed was
considered a possible victim), he was not
in custody, even though a police officer
was present in the ambulance.  However,
with respect to the second statement made
in the ambulance to a police officer to
whom Reinert was “turned over” by the
E M T af te r h is  f ir s t  seemingly
incriminating statement, we conclude that
Reinert was in custody and that his pre-
Miranda statement should not have been
admitted.  Deference is not due to the state
trial judge’s finding and conclusion to the
contrary because she mistakenly stated that
the second statement was post-Miranda
warning.  However, due to the fact that the
statement was duplicative of others
properly received after appropriate
Miranda warnings were administered, we
conclude that the error was harmless. 
Additionally, we are satisfied that when
the post-Miranda statement in the
ambulance and the subsequent (post-
surgery) statement was made at the
hospital, Reinert was alert and oriented
and that his waiver of Miranda rights was
voluntary.  The state trial court decision, in
accord with these conclusions, was not
based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the state court proceedings, nor was it
contrary to or an unreasonable application
of clearly established federal law as
determined by the United States Supreme
Court.  
The second set of issues before us
stems from Reinert’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel allegedly in violation
of his Sixth Amendment rights.  First, he
complains of his state trial counsel’s
failure to call a medical expert to testify at
the suppression hearing as to his alleged
mental and physical inability to voluntarily
and knowingly waive his Miranda rights.
However, our analysis of the record will
show that the expert testimony that Reinert
believed would have helped him would
have made no difference to the merits of
3his Miranda claim.  He also scores his
counsel’s failure to inform him of his right
to testify at the suppression hearing, but
we conclude that this claim too lacks
merit.  Reinert has thus failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his
counsel’s actions; moreover the state
court’s conclusions on the issue were not
contrary to or an unreasonable application
of clearly established federal law as
determined by the United States Supreme
Court.  
We will therefore affirm the order of
the District Court denying the petition.
I.  Background Facts
On March 10, 1991, responding to a
telephone call during which Reinert made
some rather bizarre statements, his mother
Janet Ketner and her husband rushed to his
home and found him sitting on the first
floor covered in blood, with large, visible
slashes on both wrists.  Mr. Ketner called
911, describing Reinert as delirious.
Police and ambulance services soon
arrived.  Reinert looked strange, and it was
determined that he had recently attempted
suicide by drinking alcohol, taking
sleeping pills, and slashing his wrists.  At
12:11 p.m., Officer Jeffrey Mertz
(“Mertz”) arrived, checked on Reinert and
his parents in the first floor living room,
and then went upstairs to check the
parents’ report of a body on the third floor.
When Mertz reached the third floor, he
found the body of Sean Brady, Reinert’s
long time companion, and determined that
he was dead.
Shortly after Mertz’s arrival, three
more Allentown police officers, Bruce
Zimmerman (“Zimmerman”), Robert
Lembach (“Lembach”), and Brian Brader
(“Brader”), arrived at Reinert’s home,
followed by the EMTs.  Law enforcement
officers secured the home.  The EMTs
examined Reinert; his blood pressure was
down and his pulse rate was up.  The
EMTs helped Reinert to his feet and he
then walked to the ambulance.  At this
juncture, Zimmerman was ordered by his
superiors to remain with Reinert and told
“not to let him leave your custody.”  
Reinert was laid on a stretcher inside
the ambulance, had an oxygen mask placed
over his face, was given IVs in his arms,
a n d  w a s  h o o k e d  u p  t o  a n
electrocardiograph.   Reinert had been
observed to have lacerations to his wrists
and he complained of an injured ankle.
When he was in the ambulance, the EMTs
noticed multiple lacerations to his
abdomen.  Upon discovery of the
abdominal wound, EMT Timothy Snyder
(“Sn yder”) asked Reiner t “what
happened?”  Reinert responded “I stabbed
him with a butcher knife, then I did
myself.”  Snyder at once turned to Officer
Zimmerman and stated, “I think you ought
to step in.” 
Zimmerman then, without advising
Reinert of his Miranda rights, asked him
“what happened?”  Reinert responded to
the question by stating, “I think I killed
him.  I think I stabbed him.”  At that point,
Zimmerman read Reinert his Miranda
rights.  See infra note 3.  After reading
Reinert his rights, Zimmerman asked him:
4“And with these rights in mind, do you
wish to talk to us now?”  Reinert replied:
“I think I killed him.”  When asked whom
he had killed, Reinert responded: “Sean,
Sean Brady,” “with a butcher knife.”
Once at the Lehigh Valley Medical
Center (“LVMC”), Reinert underwent
preparatory treatment for surgery by
Nurses Thomas Gavigan and Patricia
Lombardo.  Police officers were ordered
by their superiors to stand guard outside
his room.1  Reinert entered surgery at
approximately 1:15 p.m.  Prior to surgery,
Reinert was, of course, anesthetized.
Surgery lasted approximately two and one-
half hours.  Reinert lost about half a pint of
blood during the operation; he had also
lost a quart of blood prior to being treated
by the EMTs.  Reinert experienced post-
operative pain, and was given Robinal, a
sedative and muscle relaxant, at 3:30 p.m,
and Cefoxitan, an antibiotic, at 6:00 p.m.
At 7:47 p.m., Detectives Joseph
Stauffer (“Stauffer”) and Glenn Granitz
(“Granitz”) arrived at the hospital.  The
detectives first spoke to the attending
physician, Dr. Homayoun Hashemi (“Dr.
Hashemi”), who testified that he
performed a post-operative check at 7:30
p.m. on Reinert, and found him awake,
coherent, and with stable vital signs.  After
conferring with Dr. Hashemi, the
detectives went to see Reinert.  They
testified that they found him conscious,
oriented, alert, and responsive.  They
proceeded to interview him while he was
laying in the recovery room, wrists and
abdomen bandaged, attached to IVs and
other post-operative equipment.  They first
read him his Miranda rights.  The two
detectives present differing accounts as to
how Reinert responded to the question:
“Do you waive these [Miranda] rights?”
Stauffer stated that Reinert answered the
question verbally with a “yes,” whereas
Granitz said that Reinert merely nodded
his head.  Both detectives, however,
agreed that Reinert clearly communicated
to them his decision to waive his Miranda
rights.
The detectives then questioned him for
forty-five minutes, during which Reinert
stated that he had obtained a knife, had
gone to see Sean Brady, who was in bed,
and stabbed him.   Reinert’s chart
indicated no abnormality with regard to his
ability to answer questions appropriately.
Dr. Hashemi also testified that the first
administration of medication for pain,
spec i f ica l ly  m orph ine , was  no t
administered to the defendant until 10:00
    1Zimmerman asked Gavigan prior to
Reinert’s treatment, at the doors of the
trauma room, “to note down anything
that Reinert said which may be of use to
him.”  During this surgical preparation,
Gavigan asked Reinert some questions,
to which Reinert responded that he had
been fighting with his friend with a
knife, they had fallen off the bed and that
he, the friend, might have done this. 
Reinert also acknowledged he might
have wounded himself, and that he had
fallen down the stairs.  However,
Reinert’s response to the nurse is not at
issue on appeal.
5p.m.  We will amplify this factual
background in our discussion of the
procedural history and the merits issues,
infra.
II.  Procedural History
On or about March 10, 1991, Reinert
was arrested and charged with the criminal
homicide of Sean Brady.  Pre-trial
motions, including motions to suppress
physical evidence and statements, were
heard before Judge Carol K. McGinley of
the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh
County.  After a hearing, the suppression
motions were denied.
 The suppression court made a number
of relevant findings.  First, it rejected
Reinert’s claim that his pre-Miranda
statement should be dismissed, finding that
the statement was “volunteered by the
defendant to Paramedic Snyder . . . in
response to a routine question by
paramedic Snyder.”  The court further
concluded that:
. . . although the police were
present, there is nothing in the
situation which would lead a
reasonable man to believe that he
was under arrest or in the custody
of the police.  The arrival of the
police at the scene was due to a
request made on his behalf by his
mother and her husband, and the
defendant’s transport to the
Hospital Center was voluntary on
his part.  The mere fact that police
were present was not in any way
indicative that the defendant was in
their custody.  Their presence
would be explained by many
things, including a desire to
interview an important witness or a
desire to protect a potential victim.
We conclude therefore that the
statement made to paramedic
Snyder was not made while the
defendant was in custody and,
furthermore, that it was not made
pursuant to interrogation by police
officers.
Second, the suppression court concluded
that:
The defendant remained
conscious, alert and oriented
throughout his transport to the
hospital.  No medication was
administered to him in the care of
the Emergency Medical Service
Unit.
Then, after describing his treatment in the
emergency room, the Court found that
Reinert
. . . remained alert and coherent.
He responded to questions
concerning allergies to medication
and to the approximate time of his
most recent tetanus inoculation.  He
indicated he was allergic to
penicillin.  Ms. Lombardo observed
that his blood pressure was stable,
that his pulse was providing him
with adequate oxygenation to the
brain, and she performed the
Glasgow coma score to determine
6his level of consciousness.  In all
categories the defendant received
the highest possible score.
Turning to the next phase of the
treatment, the surgery, from which Reinert
returned at approximately 4:05 p.m., the
suppression court found:
At 7:47 p.m. Detective Stauffer
arrived at the hospital with
Detective Granitz.  After speaking
to the attending physician, Dr.
Homayoun Hashemi, the detectives
proceeded to interview the patient.
The questioning began at least five
hours after the defendant’s surgery
had been completed.
Detective Stauffer determined
that the patient was conscious and
oriented.  He asked him his date of
birth and his social security
number, both of which were later
verified as accurate.  He asked him
other questions to determine
whether or not the defendant was
aware of his surroundings and
received satisfactory answers.
After determining that the
defendant was able to be
responsive, Detective Stauffer
advised him of his rights, following
which the defendant said he
understood his rights and he agreed
to speak with the police.  Detective
Granitz also asked questions to
determine the capacity of the
defendant, both at the beginning
and the end of the statement.
T h e  d e f e n d a n t ,  u p o n
questioning by Detective Stauffer,
made incriminating statements.  In
the course of making these
statements the defendant was
v o l u b l e ,  a n d  v o l u n t e e r e d
information not specifically sought
by Detective Stauffer.  The
questioning ended at 8:30 p.m.
Dr. Hashemi testified that he
had performed a post-operative
check at 7:30 p.m. on the
defendant, that he had seen that the
defendant was awake, coherent,
and had stable vital signs.  His
chart indicated no abnormality with
regard to the defendant’s ability to
answer questions appropriately.
Dr. Hashemi also testified that the
first administration of medication
for pain, specifically morphine, was
not administered to the defendant
until 10:00 p.m.
Immediately following his
statements to the police, the
defendant was seen by his family,
his close friend Cindy Mellinger,
and his mother’s minister.  All
testified that he was extremely soft-
spoken at this time.
A jury trial commenced on January 15,
1992, resulting in a verdict of guilty of
murder in the first degree.  Reinert was
sentenced to life imprisonment.  Timely
post-trial motions were denied as to all
issues on November 15, 1994.
Through new (and present) counsel,
Reinert appealed to the Pennsylvania
7Superior Court.  During that appeal
Reinert raised the issue of the
effectiveness of his trial counsel,
submitting a number of affidavits/letters in
support of his ineffectiveness claim.  On
January 23, 1996, the Superior Court
denied relief on all grounds in a
Memorandum Opinion, denying the
ineffectiveness claims without ordering an
evidentiary hearing.  Inter alia, the
Superior Court stated:
After reviewing the record, we find
that trial counsel thoroughly cross-
e x a m i n e d  a l l  o f  t h e
C o mm onw ea l th ’ s  w i t n es s e s
regarding Reinert’s mental and
physical state at the time he was
given Miranda warnings and when
he made statements to both the
police and the medical staff.
Moreover, we note that the
C o m m o n w e a l t h  p r o d u c e d
overwhelming evidence that
Reinert had knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights.  Thus, we conclude that trial
counsel was not ineffective for
failing to call medical experts at the
suppression hea ring .  See
[Commonwealth v. Williams, 640
A.2d 1251 (Pa. 1994)] (counsel was
not ineffective for failing to call
expert  witnesses where he
extensively cross-examined police
officer and doctor regarding their
t e s t i m o n y ) ;  s e e  a l s o
Commonwealth v. Logan, 549 A.2d
531 (Pa. 1988) (counsel was not
ineffective for failing to employ
p s y c h i a t r i c  t e s t i m o n y  a t
suppression hearing to demonstrate
that defendant’s mental illness
prevented proper w aiver of
Miranda rights where evidence
indicated defendant was aware of
nature of right and consequence of
waiver).
The Superior Court also rejected Reinert’s
contention that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his attorneys
failed to advise him that he could testify at
the suppression hearing.  The Court found
that he established neither what his
testimony would have been, nor how it
would have altered the outcome of the
hearing.  There was never an evidentiary
hearing on the ineffectiveness issue, which
was raised for the first time in the
Pennsylvania Superior Court; the Superior
Court rejected that claim on the basis of
the record before it.
A motion for reconsideration and/or
reargument was denied by the Court.  A
petition for allowance of appeal and a
petition for reconsideration of denial of
petition for allowance of appeal were filed
and denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court on September 26, 1996, and
December 11, 1996, respectively.  A
petition for a writ of certiorari was denied
by the United States Supreme Court on
October 6, 1997.  This petition for a writ
of habeas corpus now before us was filed
on October 2, 1998, and was denied by the
District Court on July 8, 2002.  A motions
panel of this Court granted a certificate of
appealability (“COA”).  Reinert continues
to serve a sentence of life imprisonment
8for murder.  Because Reinert’s claims
were fully adjudicated in state court, we
apply the by now familiar AEDPA
standard of review, which we set forth in
the margin.2
III.  Admissibility of Reinert’s
Statements
A.  Pre-Miranda Statements to EMT
Snyder and Officer Zimmerman
As we have set forth above, at the time
    2Although our review of the District
Court’s decision is plenary, Marshall v.
Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 50 (3d Cir.
2002), under AEDPA and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362 (2000), we must deny
federal habeas corpus relief to any claim
which was adjudicated on the merits in a
state court proceeding unless such
adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding. 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2).  A state
court decision is “contrary to our clearly
established precedent if the state court
applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in our cases . . . .
[or] if the state court confronts a set of
facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a decision of this Court and
nevertheless arrives at a result different
from our precedent.”  Williams, 529 U.S.
at 405-06.  A state court decision
involves “an unreasonable application
of” clearly established federal law if it
“unreasonably applies the law of this
Court to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” 
Id. at 409. This is an objective test: “[A]
federal habeas court making the
‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should
ask whether the state court’s application
of clearly established federal law was
objectively unreasonable.”  Id. 
Moreover, “unreasonable” does not mean
“erroneous.”   Thus, “a federal habeas
court may not issue the writ simply
because that court concludes in its
independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or
incorrectly.  Rather, that application must
also be unreasonable.”  Id. at 411.
This standard does not apply,
however, to claims that the state courts
did not address on the merits.  In such
instances we exercise the pre-AEDPA
standard and “conduct a de novo review
over pure legal questions and mixed
questions of law and fact. . . .  However,
the state court’s factual determinations
are still presumed to be correct,
rebuttable upon a showing of clear and
convincing evidence.  See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1).”  Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).
9of his initial statement Reinert was in the
ambulance being tended by the EMTs.
After asking questions about his past
medical history and allergies to
medications, EMT Snyder, in an effort to
find out how the injury to the abdomen
was sustained, asked Reinert what
happened, receiving the response “I
stabbed him with a butcher knife, then I
did myself.”  At this point, Snyder notified
Officer Zimmerman and went on with his
treatment.  When asked whether he was
paying attention to the conversation taking
place between Officer Zimmerman and
Reinert, Snyder responded: “No, my job is
to administer emergency care, and my
patient is my priority.”
After Snyder asked Zimmerman to step
in, Zimmerman, without advising Reinert
of his Miranda rights, asked him “what
happened?” and Reinert responded to the
question by stating: “I think I killed him.
I think I stabbed him.”  At that point,
Zimmerman read Reinert his Miranda
rights.  More specifically, Zimmerman
read to Reinert the standard Miranda Card,
the text of which we set forth in the
margin.3  At trial, Zimmerman testified
that the following colloquy ensued.
Q.  Did Mr. Reinert respond to this
first question, “did he understand
his right?”
A.  As best as he could, yeah, he –
they were working on him and he,
you know, he kind of nodded and
then he said yes, or yeah.
Q.  Did he actually vocalize words?
A.  Right, yeah.
Q.  He said, “yeah”, correct?
A.  Correct
Q. And you then asked him a
second question, and what did he
respond then?
A.  He basically just said, “I think I
killed him” He didn’t say yes, and
then go on – he just started talking.
Q.  And what else did he say, or did
you ask any further questions?
A.  Yeah, I said, again, going back
to that first thing, “I think I killed
him, I stabbed him.”  I said “Who
did you kill?”  And he said, “Sean.”
And I asked, “Sean Brady?”
    3“My name is Officer Bruce
Zimmerman of the Allentown Police
Department.  I wish to advise you that
you have an absolute right to remain
silent.  That anything you say can and
will be used against you in a Court of
law.  That you have the right to talk to an
attorney before and have an attorney
present with you during questioning. 
That if you cannot afford to hire an
attorney one will be appointed to
represent you, without charge, before any
questioning, if you so desire.  And if you
decide to answer any questions you may
stop at any time you wish.  Do you
understand these rights I’ve explained to
you?  And with these rights in mind, do
you wish to talk to us now?”
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and—or he said, “Sean Brady,” I
said, “Is that the gentlemen upstairs
on the third floor?”  He said,
“Yes.”  I said, “How did you do
it?”  He said, “With a butcher
knife.”  
Reinert argues at great length that he
was in custody at the time of the
ambulance statements.  His principal
contentions are the following: (1) The
police had entered his home and controlled
it (though they had entered at his mother
and stepfather’s request); (2) the
investigating officers were directed to
accompany Reinert in the ambulance and
keep him in their custody; and (3) the
officers were in close proximity to Reinert
in the ambulance.  Reinert contends that
these factors combined in such a way that
a reasonable man in his situation would
not think himself “free to leave.” 
It is not entirely clear from Reinert’s
brief whether he objects to the statement
made to the EMT or only to the one made
to Zimmerman, but we will assume that
objection is made to both.  
1.  The pre-Miranda statement to EMT
Snyder
The state trial judge found as follows:
The first statement is that
statement volunteered by the
defendant to paramedic Snyder.  At
the time the statement was made, it
was volunteered by the defendant
in response to a routine question by
paramedic Snyder.  It was not
solicited by the police.
Furthermore, although the
police were present, there is
nothing in the situation which
would lead a reasonable man to
believe that he was under arrest or
in the custody of the police.  The
arrival of the police at the scene
was due to a request made on his
behalf by his mother and her
husband, and the defendant’s
transport to the Hospital Center was
voluntary on his part.  The mere
fact that police were present was
not in any way indicative that the
defendant was in their custody.
Their presence could be explained
by many things, including a desire
to interview an important witness
or a desire to protect a potential
victim.
We conclude, therefore, that the
statement made to paramedic
Snyder was not made while the
defendant was in custody, and,
furthermore, that it was not made
pursuant to interrogation by police
officers.
The question, of course, is whether the
state court’s determination that Reinert
was not in custody is contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States, or resulted in a decision that
was  based on an  unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court
proceeding.  We do not believe that this
standard is met by Reinert with respect to
11
the statement made to the EMTs.  Reinert
was not in custody, nor was he a suspect in
a crime when he entered the ambulance for
the purpose of medical treatment and
transport to the hospital.  Although police
officers accompanied Reinert in the
ambulance, at that time officers had the
limited knowledge that a body was found
inside the house and that Reinert appeared
to be wounded.  Officers could have
reasonably assumed that Reinert was a
victim who could possibly identify a third
person that may have been in the house.
Snyder stated that police officers regularly
ride with him in the ambulance and that he
requested police officers to accompany
him on this occasion.
Ordinarily, in determining whether an
individual is in custody, the ultimate
inquiry is “whether there is a ‘formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement’ of
the degree associated with a formal arrest.”
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)).  When
the individual has not been openly arrested
when  the sta tements are made,
“‘something must be said or done by the
authorities, either in their manner of
approach or in the tone or extent of their
questioning, which indicates they would
not have heeded a request to depart or to
allow the suspect to do so.’”  Steigler v.
Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.
1974) (quoting United States v. Hall, 421
F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1969)).
Reinert argues that the interrogation in
the ambulance was custodial because he
was never told that he was free to leave or
free not to answer questions.  He contrasts
his situation with the one at issue in United
States v. Leese, 176 F.3d 740 (3d Cir.
1999), where a postal employee suspected
of having stolen postal funds was found
not to be in custody during the course of
an interrogation where she was told she
was not under arrest, that she would not be
made to go with her questioners when they
left, and during the course of which she
was allowed to take breaks in order to
consult with her union representative.
Reinert argues that unlike in Leese where
the suspect was given ample opportunity to
end questioning and where she was
explicitly told that she was not under
arrest, Reinert was never afforded similar
information or opportunities.
While the difference is real, it is not
dispositive.  Had Zimmerman made an
explicit statement to Reinert that he was
not under arrest or that he need not answer
questions, such a statement would surely
have bolstered the governmen t’s
contention that Snyder’s questioning was
non-custodial in nature.  However, the
absence of such a statement does not ipso
facto turn questioning into a custodial
interrogation, especially when the
questioning is being done by a medical
professional in the course of providing
routine medical care.  See Mathiason, 429
U.S. at 495 (“[P]olice officers are not
required to administer Miranda warnings
to everyone whom they question.  Nor is
the requirement of warnings to be imposed
simply because . . . the questioned person
is one whom the police suspect.”)  Given
that Reinert was in the ambulance
12
receiving care for an open wound and had
an oxygen mask covering his face, it seems
unlikely that he could or would have left
the EMTs’ care, even if Zimmerman had
told him that he was at liberty to do so.
Under those circumstances, an explanation
that he was not required to answer
questions would have no doubt been more
meaningful and more appropriate.
However, as we explained above, such a
statement, while helpful to determine the
custodial nature of the interrogation, is not
required to render an interrogation non-
custodial.
More to the point, although Officer
Zimmerman was present under the
described circumstances, the case of
ambulance transportation is oblique to the
core of “in custody” jurisprudence where
the focus is on the relationship between the
officers and the suspect in terms of
putative coercion and freedom to leave.  In
our view, the presence of Zimmerman in
the ambulance was a background factor in
terms of Reinert’s statement to Snyder.
Reinert had entered the ambulance
voluntarily and was in the charge of the
EMTs who elicited the challenged
statement innocently (they did not know
Reinert to be a criminal suspect) in the
course of obtaining routine medical
information.  Under these circumstances,
and others recited above, we do not think
that the state trial judge’s determination
was based  on  an  unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the
evidence.  Nor was the legal conclusion
based thereon contrary to or an
unreasonable application of federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court.
Accordingly we will affirm the order of
the District Court on that issue.
2.  The pre-Miranda statement to Officer
Zimmerman
The statement made to Officer
Zimmerman in response to his “what
happened” question (“I think I killed him,
I stabbed him.”) is another matter.  At that
point Reinert had made an incriminating
statement, and when the EMT turned him
over to Officer Zimmerman, he had to
know that he was a suspect being
questioned by a police officer.  Prior to
starting his question, Zimmerman should
have, but failed to, read Reinert his
Miranda rights.  The state trial judge’s
treatment of this matter was premised on a
misapprehension or misstatement of the
facts—that Reinert had been Mirandized
already when, in fact, he had not: “The
next statement made by the defendant was
a statement given to Officer Zimmerman
in the ambulance.  Prior to this statement,
Officer Zimmerman advised the defendant
of his Miranda rights, following which the
defendant indicated that he wished to
answer questions.”  The Commonwealth
now concedes that the judge was mistaken
in stating that Reinert was given Miranda
warnings before the statement to
Zimmerman.  We must therefore reject the
state court’s finding with respect to the
first ambulance statement to Zimmerman.
However, “[w]here a subsequent
confession is obtained constitutionally, the
admission of prior  inad missib le
confessions [is] harmless error.”  United
States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d
13
Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.
Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir.
1987)) (first alteration in original).
Because we conclude that Reinert made
subsequent, constitutionally obtained,
admissible statements that mirrored his
earlier un-Mirandized statement, see infra
Parts III.B and III.C, we hold that
admission of the initial statement was
harmless error, even under the stringent
constitutional error standard where we
may affirm only if the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See United
States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698,
703 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
B.  The Post-Miranda Statement to
Officer Zimmerman
At this point, Zimmerman read Reinert
his Miranda rights.  The issues presented
by Reinert are twofold.  He contends (1)
that he was not physically and mentally
capable of knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights and
(2) that even if he were, the post-Miranda
statement was not validly obtained in light
of his pre-Miranda confession.  
1.  Competence and waiver
The Supreme Court has frequently
articulated the applicable waiver standard.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), the Court held as to waiver and
burden:
The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made
voluntarily,  knowingly and
intelligently.
* * *
If the interrogation continues
without the presence of an attorney
and a statement is taken, a heavy
burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived
his  priv i lege  against self -
incrimination and his right to
retained or appointed counsel.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
490, n.14 [(1964)].  This Court has
always set high standards of proof
for the waiver of constitutional
rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938), and we reassert these
standards as applied to in-custody
interrogation. 
Id. at 444, 475 (emphasis added).
The Court made clear in Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, (1986), the two-
pronged test for waiver:
First, the relinquishment of the
right must have been voluntary in
the sense that it was the product of
a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or
deception.  Second, the waiver
must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the
right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to
abandon it.  Only if the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation reveal both an
uncoerced choice and the requisite
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level of comprehension may a court
properly conclude that the Miranda
rights have been waived. 
Id. at 421 (internal quotations marks and
citations omitted).
We have also explained that:
This inquiry requires us to consider
the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation,
which includes examining the
events that occurred and the
background, experience, and
conduct of the defendant. Miranda
rights will be deemed waived only
whe re the to tality of the
circumstances “reveal[s] both an
uncoerced choice and the requisite
level of comprehension.”
United States v. Sriyuth , 98 F.3d 739, 749
(3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at
421) (citations omitted). 
The state trial judge concluded, after
the suppression hearing, that Reinert’s
mental and physical states were such that
he was “conscious, alert and oriented on
three spheres.”  She added that: 
[T]he interview by Officer
Zimmerman was brief , the
interrogation routine, and the
detention basically the result of
circumstances created by the
defendant.  Clearly there was no
physical threat to the defendant
from the police inasmuch as the
interview took place in the
ambulance in the presence of
paramedics.  We firmly conclude
that there was no physical or
psychological coercion in the
situation, nor in the questioning
technique used by Off icer
Zimmerman.
This finding is clearly supported in the
record.  EMT Snyder testified at the
suppression hearing that Reinert remained
“conscious, alert, and oriented throughout
our transport” and that he was “very much
aware and awake, and knew what was
going on.  I explained every part of the
treatment that I was doing for him, and he
understood that fully.”  When asked, “And
this was during the entire time when
Officer Zimmerman was talking to Mr.
Reinert as well?”, Snyder responded,
“That’s correct.”  In sum, Snyder stated
that Reinert answered all questions posed
to him “ intelligently.”  Officer
Zimmerman testified that Reinert was
“lucid and coherent.”  And Officer
Lembach, who was also in the ambulance,
testified that Reinert was alert and
coherent, and that his answers to questions
asked in the ambulance were responsive
and pertinent and did not go off on
tangents.  
As noted above, Reinert had walked to
the ambulance.  The record of treatment
administered to him in the ambulance was
unexceptional.  Reinert was wearing an
oxygen mask but that did not impair
communication.  He was receiving IV
fluids and was connected to an
electrocardiograph.  His vital signs were
monitored.  But none of this impaired his
coherence.  Supporting this conclusion is
the testimony of Nurse Patricia Lombardo
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of  LVMC who, shortly after Reinert’s
admission, observed him and administered
the Glasgow coma test, about which she
discoursed at some length.  The short of it
is that Reinert received the highest
(Glasgow) score for verbal and motor
response, and for being alert and oriented.
His respiratory rate, vital signs, etc., were
all good.  Independently, Nurse Lombardo
concluded that Reinert was alert.
In opposition to this welter of
testimony the state trial judge had only the
testimony of Reinert’s mother and
stepfather, which it had the clear right not
to credit, and did not credit.  In this appeal,
Reinert relies largely on the affidavits of
two psychiatrists whose affidavits were
offered at the Pennsylvania Superior Court
level as appendices to his direct appeal
brief.  The Superior Court declined to
consider these affidavits and none of them
were before the trial court.  They were also
attached to his federal habeas petition.
These psychiatrists, Dr. Lynn Bornfriend
(“Dr. Bornfriend”) and Dr. Robert Sadoff
(“Dr. Sadoff”), did not examine or witness
Reinert during the time period in which he
was in the hospital or in the ambulance,
and relied solely upon the narratives of
Reinert’s family and friends and excerpts
from the (subsequent) medical records of
LVMC.
The Commonwealth submits that we
cannot consider these affidavits which
were not a matter of record and which are
presented to the Court merely as
attachments to a pleading, citing United
States v. Madkins, 994 F.2d 540, 542-43
(8th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v.
Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 1983)
(holding efforts to supplement record by
affidavits or attachments to brief
improper)).  Reinert counters with the
argument that consideration of these
affidavits is necessary to demonstrate the
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel in not
presenting expert evidence at the
suppression hearing.  This “counter”
seems inadequate because the affidavits
are being presented in support of two
different contentions: a merits issue
involving Miranda rights and a collateral
issue involving the ineffective assistance
of counsel.  Given that these affidavits
were not part of the record before the trial
court, Reinert most likely procedurally
defaulted this line of argument on his
Miranda claims, and should be allowed
only to use the affidavits insofar as his
claim for ineffectiveness is concerned.
However, since the affidavits relate both to
the Miranda and ineffectiveness issues,
and since we will need to examine the
a f f idav i t s  w h e n  w e  r e a ch th e
ineffectiveness claims, we will, out of an
abundance of caution, consider the
substance of the Sadoff and Bornfriend
affidavits—both of which conclude that
Reinert was not competent physically or
mentally to waive Miranda rights or to
make statements either in the ambulance or
post-operatively at the hospital—in terms
of the Miranda claims as well. 
Dr. Bornfriend relies on a number of
factors: (1) several nursing entries
describing Reinert as confused after his
admission to LVMC; (2) lab evidence of
dehydration, blood loss, liver damage and
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an extruding wound (the occasion for the
subsequent surgery); and (3) an increased
white blood cell count.  Dr. Bornfriend
opines that Reinert was in emotional
shock, largely as the result of having been
in the house with a corpse for two days.
She also makes reference to his recent
suicide attempt.  Dr. Sadoff relies on: (1)
Reinert’s mother’s description of his
confusion; (2) the emotional shock of the
altercation with Sean Brady; and (3)
Reinert’s low blood pressure and fast heart
rate.  We find this counter underwhelming,
surely not enough to render the state trial
judge’s supported findings unreasonable or
to undermine her conclusions of law under
the AEDPA standard as to the validity of
the waiver and the post-Miranda statement
in the ambulance.  
2. Validity of post-Miranda statement
Reinert argues that, even had he been
competent to waive his Miranda rights in
the ambulance, the post-Miranda
statement would nevertheless be invalid
because it followed too quickly on the
heels of a non-Mirandized confession.  To
support his contention, Reinert attempts,
unsuccessfully, to distinguish his case
from Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1985).  In Elstad, a man suspected of
burglary made an incriminating statement
in his own home without having been
Mirandized.  He was taken to the police
station, and after he was advised of and
waived his Miranda rights, the suspect
produced a written confession.  In his
subsequent prosecution for burglary, the
state trial court excluded from evidence his
first statement because he had not been
given Miranda warnings, but admitted the
written confession.  Elstad was convicted,
but the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the confession should also
have been excluded because of the brief
p e r i o d  s e p a r a t i n g  h i s  i n i t i a l ,
unconstitutionally obtained statement and
his subsequent confession.  In reversing
the Oregon Court of Appeals, the United
States Supreme Court explained that the
failure of police to administer Miranda
warnings does not mean that the
statements received have actually been
coerced, but only that courts will presume
the privilege against  compulsory
se l f -incr imina t ion  has  not  been
intelligently exercised.  See Elstad, 470
U.S. at 304-11.  
The Court held that it was “an
unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold
that a simple failure to administer the
warnings, unaccompanied by any actual
coercion or other circumstances calculated
to undermine the suspect’s ability to
exercise his free will, so taints the
investigatory process that a subsequent
voluntary and informed waiver is
ineffective for some indeterminate period.”
Id. at 309.  The Court further held that
although Miranda “requires that the
unwarned admission must be suppressed,
the admissibility of any subsequent
sta tement should turn in  these
circumstances solely on whether it is
knowingly and voluntarily made.”  Id.
Absent deliberate coercion or improper
tactics in obtaining an unwarned
statement, a careful and thorough
administration of Miranda warnings cures
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the condition that rendered the unwarned
statement inadmissible.  See id. at 311-12.
 Reinert argues that no cure could be
made in his case because the police created
coercive circumstances and that other
independent circumstances, such as the
injury and resulting pain, tainted the
investigatory process beyond repair.  We
disagree.  The Supreme Court’s most
recent pronouncement on this issue
supports our conclusion.  In Missouri v.
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004), a suspect
was questioned for 30 to 40 minutes and
confessed to her role in the crime of
second-degree murder.  She was given a
20-minute break and was only then
Mirandized.  After receiving her Miranda
warnings, she signed a waiver and the
questioning resumed.  During the post-
Miranda questioning, she was confronted
with her prewarning statements, and was
made to repeat the information she had
given before she was Mirandized.  In
holding unconstitutional the interrogation
technique of intentionally withholding
Miranda rights to obtain a confession and
of subsequently reading the Miranda rights
and continuing on with the interrogation,
the Supreme Court distinguished Seibert
from Elstad in the following way:
Elstad rejected the “cat out of the
bag” theory that any short, earlier
admission, obtained in arguably
innocent neglect of Miranda,
determined the character of the
later, warned confession, Elstad,
470 U.S. at 311-14; on the facts of
that case, the Court thought any
causal connection between the first
and second responses to the police
was “speculative and attenuated,”
id. at 313.  Although the Elstad
Court expressed no explicit
conclusion about either officer’s
state of mind, it is fair to read
Elstad as treating the living room
conversation as a good-faith
Miranda mistake, not only open to
correction by careful warnings
before systematic questioning in
that particular case, but posing no
threat to warn-first practice
generally.  See Elstad, [470 U.S.] at
309 (characterizing the officers’
omission of Miranda warnings as
“a simple failure to administer the
warnings, unaccompanied by any
a c t u a l  c o e r c io n  o r  o t h er
circumstances calculated to
undermine the suspect’s ability to
exercise his free will”).
Id. at 2612.
We are confident that Reinert’s case
more closely resembles Elstad’s than
Siebert’s.  Zimmerman’s initial failure to
read Reinert his Miranda rights, though
unfortunate and unexplained, seems much
more likely to have been a simple failure
to administer the warnings rather than an
intentional withholding that was part of a
larger, nefarious plot.  While it would have
been preferable for Zimmerman to read
Reinert his rights immediately before
eliciting the initial response, we conclude
that the cure mandated by Elstad was met
in this case and that, because Reinert’s
waiver was knowing and voluntary, the
post-Miranda statement was properly
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entered into evidence.
C. The Statement at the Hospital
Probably the most incriminating
statement made by Reinert was that made
to Detectives Stauffer and Granitz after
surgery at LVMC.  In that statement
Reinert admitted that he had obtained a
knife and then went to see Brady, who was
in bed, and stabbed him.  We have already
recounted the essential history of the
events after Reinert’s admission to the
hospital, see supra Part I.  We have
amplified that description through
recitation of the state trial judge’s findings,
see supra Part II; we will not rescribe that
material here.  However, our review of the
record confirms that all the facts stated by
Judge McGinley are supported by the
record.
As our frame of reference, we reiterate
that surgery (on March 10, 1991) lasted
from 1:15 p.m. to 3:45 p.m., and the
interrogation took place at about 8:00 p.m.
It was discovered during surgery that one
of the knife wounds in Reinert’s abdomen
had also cut his liver.  The surgery
consisted of an exploratory laparotomy to
examine stab wounds to the abdomen.  The
results were essentially negative, except
for a non-bleeding laceration of the left
lobe of the liver and a large retroperitoneal
hematoma.  There was no evidence of
injury to any intraabdominal organ.
Because the retroperitoneal hematoma was
stable, nothing was done, and the abdomen
was closed after copious irrigation.
Reinert’s wrist lacerations were then
repaired, and he was taken to the Shock
Trauma Unit for observation.  
We have scrutinized the entire LVMC
record.  That record is consistent with the
facts chronicled above, most importantly
that at times relevant Reinert was alert and
oriented.  Initially, the surgeon, Dr. Barry
Slavin, reported that Reinert woke up
promptly and was awake and alert after
recovery from anesthesia.  Morphine for
pain was not administered until 10:00
p.m., well after the statement at issue had
been made.  Reinert was also given
Robinal, a sedative and muscle relaxant, at
3:30 p.m. and Cefoxitan, an antibiotic, at
6:30 p.m.  The most important witness,
however, was Dr. Hashemi, the chief
surgical resident, who had come to LVMC
afer three years of surgical residence at
Presbyterian and the University of
Pennsylvania Medical Center.  As noted
above, Dr. Hashemi testified that he had
performed a post-operative check at 7:30
p.m. on the defendant, and that he had seen
that Reinert was awake, coherent, and had
stable vital signs.  His chart indicated no
abnormality with regard to Reinert’s
ability to answer questions appropriately.
This testimony accords with that of the
detectives who questioned Reinert after his
surgery and said that they found him
conscious, oriented, alert, and responsive.
Arrayed against this solid phalanx of
evidence is the testimony of Reinert’s
mother, stepfather, a friend Cindy
Mellinger, and Reinert’s mother’s pastor,
Ronald Keller, who saw Reinert after the
police left.  They all described him as
extremely quiet and soft spoken, kind of
“mumbly,” heavily sedated.  Reinert also
contends that he was affected by the pre-
surgical med icine, especia lly the
19
anesthesia, and by the Robinal given at
3:30 p.m.  Additionally, Reinert relies
heavily on appeal on a psychiatric consult
the day after surgery.  
Dr. Joseph Antonowicz, a psychiatrist,
reported that:
The patient tells me that he
remembers essentially nothing of
the events that led to his
hospitalization here.  He tells me
that the police have informed him
that they suspect him of having
murdered Shawn.  He is quite
surprised by this.  The patient is
very tearful at the loss of Shawn
and seems to genuinely miss him.
He states that he currently does
have suicidal ideation, although he
does not have a plan at this time.  
The patient is an alert,
cooperative young man who
appears quite sad.  He also appears
very befuddled and shows some
disorganization in his thought
process.  He tends to be somewhat
rambling and at times is mildly
loosened in his associations.  He
seems quite bewildered by what’s
going on as well as frightened.
There are no hallucinations.  There
do not appear to be delusions
present at this time.  However, the
patient is somewhat guarded in his
history.  Affect is depressed.
Sensorium: He is oriented times
three.  Memory: 2 of 3 objects at 5
minutes.  Similes: Good.  Proverbs:
Quite concrete.  Insight: Limited.
Judgment: Good on formal testing.
IMPRESSIONS: The patient is
a 27 year old white male admitted
to the Lehigh Valley Hospital
Center on 03/10/91 followed self
inflicted stab wounds with slashed
wrists.  He is currently under arrest
on suspicion of having murdered
his roommate.  The patient has
essentially no recollection of events
leading to and including these
alleged occurrences.  At the present
time he is confused, overwhelmed,
frightened and seemed somewhat
disorganized in his thought
processes.
Working diagnoses are: 
1.  Psychogenic amnesia versus
malingering.
2.  Possible reactive psychosis.
I am uncertain about the presence
of psychosis in this case, although
he does seem inordinately
bewildered and disorganized.
These pieces of evidence are used by
Drs. Bornfriend and Sadoff in their
affidavits.  Dr. Bornfriend writes:
Reinert was in the Operating Room
for laparotomy and tendon repair
until around 4:00 in the afternoon.
During surgery, he was given many
anesthetics, including Fentanyl, a
synthetic narcotic, and Robinal, a
sedative and muscle relaxant.
Without the above medications, any
patient would be in severe pain
after such extensive surgery.  It
was, therefore, clear that the
narcotic and sedative and muscle
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r e l a x an t  e f f e c t s  o f  th e se
medications persisted and remained
during the course of Mr. Reinert’s
being interviewed by the police and
that when these medications wore
off, Mr. Reinert was in severe pain
and required 4 mgs. of morphine.
In addition, the fact that a physician
told police officers that Mr.
Reinert’s health would not be
threatened by their questioning him
does not imply that he was
cognitively and mentally clear
enough for them to do so.
Dr. Sadoff recapitulates the traumatic
events preceding the stabbing, the
impressions of Dr. Antonowicz, the reports
of the family members who saw Reinert
after the surgery, and the LVMC records.
He concludes:
One is usually in a fairly
confused state of mind following
surgery with general anesthesia,
and is not thinking as clearly
usually, as one does after several
days.  Scot had just been through a
serious altercation with his lover,
had lost his lover by death and had
been in a state of shock himself
following loss of large quantities of
blood due to self-inflicted and other
wounds to his wrists and his
abdomen.  He appeared confused to
his mother on the telephone and
also when she visited him at his
residence shortly thereafter.  He
also appeared less than clear to his
mother, stepfather, pastor and
female friend while in the hospital
following surgery.
Thus, for all the reasons noted
above, it is my opinion, within
reasonable medical and psychiatric
certainty, that at the time of the
taking of the statement of Scot
Reinert, he was not at his clearest
thinking and was under the
influence of the shock of the loss of
his lover, the shock of his own
wounds and recently emerging
from general anesthesia with
abdominal surgery and that his will
and strength and clarity of mind
were all impaired.  It is more likely
than not that at the time he was
interrogated by the police and given
his Miranda rights, his emotional
state was so impaired that he would
not have been able to resist
effectively the demands of the
police at the time or the requests of
the police.  It would seem that his
statement would not be totally
voluntary, as he may choose, when
in a clearer state of mind, to resist
giving such a statement, especially
under the advice of his attorney, if
he had been allowed to see his
attorney prior to the interrogation.
The note of Dr. Antonowicz, the
psychiatrist who examined him in
consultation one day after he was
admitted and then three days later,
indicated a clearing of his
sens o r i u m o n  t h e  s e cond
examination.  This implies that his
first examination showed Scot to be
less than clear, and that was one
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day after his admission or one day
after the interrogation. . . .
Thus, it is for all these reasons
that it is my opinion, within
reasonable medical certainty, that at
the time of the taking of the
statement by the police, Scot
Reinert was in such a weakened
state of emotional condition
following the shock to his system
from the death of his lover, the
wounds that he had to his own
body, the medication that he was
under, the loss of blood, the
surgical procedure under general
anesthesia, that his mental state was
not clear enough for him to be
competent to waive his Miranda
warnings or to give a truly
voluntary statement.
W e  f i n d  t h e s e  a rg u m e n t s
underwhelming, and conclude that they do
not even come close to rendering the state
trial judge’s findings of fact unreasonable
under the totality of the record, or in any
way undermine her conclusions of law
under the AEDPA standard.  The
Bornfriend and Sadoff affidavits are
extremely generalized and conclusory and,
at all events, do not counter the
considerable evidence of Reinert’s
competence to waive his Miranda rights
and to make a statement which was
credited by the suppression judge, to
whose findings heavy deference is owed
under AEDPA.  Indeed, they also rely on
statements that the judge discredited.
Additionally, we note that the Superior
Court also made findings of fact consonant
with those of Judge McGinley, see supra
Part II, which are entitled to deference.
See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).4
    4 Reinert urges us to follow the
example of the Supreme Courts of
Minnesota and Alaska and rule that, in
the absence of an electronic record of the
custodial interrogation in the hospital (by
either audiotape or videotape), we should
suppress the confession as a violation of
the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment,
protections of due process, protection
against self-incrimination, and provisions
for effective assistance of counsel and
confrontation.  See State v. Scales, 518
N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994) (holding that
custodial interrogations must be recorded
where feasible); Stephan v. State, 711
P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (holding that
non-recorded statements made during the
course of a custodial interrogation should
be suppressed because they were
obtained in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Alaska Constitution). 
While the advocated policy may be a
desirable one, Reinert can point to no
Pennsylvania law supporting it; indeed
there is none.  Even if there were such a
rule announced in Pennsylvania, we, as a
federal court sitting in habeas
jurisdiction, would not have the authority
to review a violation of the state
constitution.  It therefore goes without
saying that, given that there is no right to
recorded custodial interrogations under
Pennsylvania law, we are certainly not at
liberty to create one.  Insofar as Reinert
invokes the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
of the Federal Constitution, he invokes a
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IV.  The Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims
A.  Failure of State Trial Counsel to Call
a Medical Expert to Testify at the
Suppression Hearing as to Reinert’s
Alleged Mental and Physical Inability to
Voluntarily and Knowingly Waive His
Miranda Rights
Reinert claims that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to call an expert
medical or psychiatric witness to testify
about his physical and mental condition at
the time he waived his Miranda rights.  In
order successfully to claim ineffective
assistance of counsel, Reinert must
establish both that his attorney’s
performance was objectively unreasonable
and that, but for the deficient performance,
there would have been a reasonable
probability of a different outcome.  See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).  Reinert can make neither showing
here.  After reviewing the record, the
Superior Court found that trial counsel
thoroughly cross-examined all the
Commonwealth’s witnesses regarding
Reinert’s mental and physical state at the
time he was given his Miranda warnings
and when he made statements to the police
and medical staff: “We conclude that trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to
call medical experts at the suppression
hearing.”  Indeed, the state court followed
the relevant Pennsylvania authority for the
proposition that trial counsel need not
introduce expert testimony on his client’s
behalf if he is able effectively to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses and elicit
helpful testimony.  See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 640 A.2d 1251, 1265 (Pa. 1994).
Trial counsel was surely able to do so here.
The Superior Court’s rejection, under
Williams, of Reinert’s claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to call
an expert witness with respect to his
mental and physical condition was not an
unreasonable application of the standards
set forth in Strickland in light of the
evidence from police officers and medical
personnel that Reinert’s waiver of his
Miranda rights was knowing and
voluntary.  Reinert’s claim must therefore
fail.  Furthermore, we reject the notion,
advanced at oral argument, that Reinert
should be entitled to an ineffective
assistance of counsel hearing at this
juncture.  Given the well developed record
in this case and our analysis of it above,
we do not see what more useful
information could be elicited at this time.
B.  Failure to Inform Reinert of His
Right to Testify at the Suppression
Hearing
Reinert contends that his state trial
counsel was ineffective for not informing
him of his right to testify at the
suppression hearing.  At the suppression
hearing Reinert’s counsel called his
purported federal right to have a
custodial interrogation recorded.  He
does not, however, cite any authority for
this proposition; again there is none.  We
will, at this juncture, decline to infer a
federal right to have custodial
interrogations recorded.
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mother, stepfather, a female friend, and his
mother’s pastor to testify about his
physical condition post-surgery and prior
to his statement to the officers.  Reinert’s
mother and stepfather also testified to
Reinert’s condition prior to his transport to
the hospital (and prior to his initial
statement).  Additionally the medical
records of LVMC were before the
suppression court.  The suppression court
thus had before it a considerable amount of
evidence supporting Reinert’s position that
he was not competent to give a statement
or to waive Miranda rights.  We do not see
that Reinert’s testimony would have added
anything to the mix in his favor, and, as
the Pennsylvania Superior Court observed,
Reinert failed to state with any specificity
what his testimony would have been
and/or how his testimony would have
altered the outcome of the hearing.  The
Superior Court concluded that Reinert had
failed to establish that his claim had
arguable merit, that his counsel’s actions
were unreasonable, or that he suffered
prejudice.  In our view, the District Court
correctly concluded that the state court’s
resolution of this claim was not objectively
unreasonable.  The Superior Court also
found that Reinert had failed to show that
he was prejudiced by the failure of counsel
to inform him of his right to testify at the
suppression hearing, i.e., that there was a
reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.5  
    5While we need not decide whether
counsel’s performance was deficient, it is
worth noting that Reinert’s testimony
might have been risky to his defense. 
Reinert testified extensively at trial about
the entire incident leading up to and
following the death of Sean Brady.  By
taking the stand at the suppression
hearing, Reinert may have been
providing the Commonwealth with the
means to impeach his testimony.  In
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,
93-94 (1980), the Supreme Court
reserved the question whether Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968),
precludes the use of a defendant’s
testimony at a suppression hearing to
impeach his testimony at trial.  The Court
noted, however, that a number of courts
considering the question had held that
such testimony is admissible as evidence
of impeachment.  Id. at 94 & n.8 (citing
Gray v. State, 403 A.2d 853, 858 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (noting that nothing
in Simmons precludes use of defendant’s
testimony at suppression hearing for
purpose of impeachment at trial); People
v. Sturgis, 317 N.E.2d 545, 547-48 (Ill.
1974) (same); People v. Douglas, 136
Cal. Rptr. 358, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that defendant’s testimony at
suppression hearing was admissible for
impeachment purposes because
defendant took the stand in his trial and
testified in a manner inconsistent with his
pretrial testimony)).  Were we to adopt a
similar interpretation of Simmons and
conclude that suppression testimony was
fair game for impeachment purposes, the
action of putting Reinert on the stand
during the suppression hearing could
have itself potentially become subject to
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Finally, we consider the affidavit
submitted by Reinert’s trial attorney Diane
Dickson.  In our view, the Dickson
affidavit, which constitutes a conclusory
concession of ineffectiveness by trial
counsel, does not mitigate the propriety of
the actions taken during the time of trial,
and does not affect the outcome. 
V.  Conclusion
In light of our extensive review of the
record before us, we conclude that the
state trial court’s decision to deny
Reinert’s motion to suppress the
statements at issue was not an
unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the state
court proceedings, and that it was neither
contrary to nor an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal
law as determined by the United States
Supreme Court.  To the extent that the
state trial court’s finding on the one pre-
Miranda statement made to Officer
Zimmerman was in fact unreasonable in
light of the evidence presented before it,
the statement should have been
suppressed.  However, the admission of
duplicative statements was proper, and the
error was therefore harmless.
As for Reinert’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, he has failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his
counsel’s performance, and the state
court’s conclusions on the issue were not
contrary to or an unreasonable application
of clearly established federal law as
determined by the United States Supreme
Court.  
We will therefore affirm the order of
the District Court denying the petition.
an allegation of ineffectiveness.
